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“Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to 
the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory. . . .” 
Justice Louis Brandeis 
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PRELUDE 
Linda looked forward to spending the weekend with her son.1 Truthfully, 
she anticipated the time with her grandchildren much more-so. Her “sweetpea” 
and “pumpkin” were lights of joy and hope to a woman surviving during the 
darkest period of her fifty-nine years. The prolonged cancer that stole her hus-
band, Robert, also wreaked havoc on Linda’s financial security and her own 
health. A six-hour drive to California remained as Linda’s geographical obsta-
cle and kept her from the solace of family. Final check of the necessities: 
clothes (check), toiletries (check), phone charger (check), blood pressure pills 
(check), marijuana (check). 
Yes, Linda legally owned a Nevada-issued medical marijuana card, which 
allowed her to legally possess and consume marijuana purchased from a li-
censed cannabis retailer.2 In 2016, the citizens of Nevada also voted to legalize 
recreational marijuana, but the structure and procedures were not yet in place to 
allow purchase without a medical card, whether Nevada-issued or one issued 
by another medical marijuana state.3 Similarly, Linda’s destination also voted 
to move from solely medical to recreational marijuana, but the Golden State 
had also yet to effectuate the move in practice.4 Thus, since California dispen-
saries only allowed patients with California-issued cards,5 Linda made sure to 
procure her medicine before she left. 
Hours later, Linda sat not with her family, but behind bars where she faced 
a federal felony for transporting a Schedule I Controlled Substance across state 
lines.6 The FBI agent that Linda rear-ended in the chain-reaction crash on the 
interstate seemed as uninterested in her medical marijuana card as he appeared 
irrational in avenging his fallen steed. This subject is one of many Linda would 
like to discuss with a lawyer. If one finally showed up that is, because, despite 
                                                        
1  Linda and her story is fiction. The laws which affect her are fact. 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 453A.140 (2015). 
3  Chris Kudialis, Las Vegas Marijuana Laws: Answers to Questions on Recreational Weed 
in Nevada, LAS VEGAS SUN (Jan. 3, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2017/jan/ 
03/some-answers-for-your-questions-on-recreational-ma/ [https://perma.cc/EUF5-UG2N]. 
4  Kathy Park, Clearing Up Cannabis Confusion in California: What You Need to Know, 
KCRA (Jan. 2, 2017, 9:57 PM), http://www.kcra.com/article/clearing-up-cannabis-
confusion-in-california-what-you-need-to-know/8555949 [https://perma.cc/4RDE-E4HA]. 
5  See Lisa Rough, Which U.S. States Accept Out-of-State Medical Marijuana Authoriza-
tions?, LEAFLY (Jun. 16, 2017), https://www.leafly.com/news/cannabis-101/which-us-states-
accept-out-of-state-medical-marijuana-authorizati/ [https://perma.cc/V5EG-QF7S]. 
6  21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012). 
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promises of due process7 and speedy trials,8 Linda started to feel more forgotten 
and lost in time. She desperately needed her court-appointed attorney to pro-
vide her with the effective assistance of counsel the United States Constitution 
guarantees.9 
INTRODUCTION TO THE WAR ON DRUGS’S ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION 
The War on Drugs has faced harsh criticism beyond the legally-possible, 
factually-plausible tragedy of the Prelude, both for failing to cure the ills it pur-
ports to battle, as well as for the collateral devastation left in its wake.10 Though 
analysis of the many possible benefits to ending the War on Drugs extends far 
beyond the scope of this work, examples of just a few include addressing the 
following: mass incarceration,11 disproportionate enforcement of drug laws 
against the poor and minorities,12 the financial cost to taxpayers,13 black market 
violence,14 penalizing instead of treating the disease of addiction,15 stunted ad-
vancement in medical research,16 disenfranchisement,17 and lost economic op-
                                                        
7  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
8  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
9  See infra Part I. 
10  Matthew Boesler & Ashley Lutz, 32 Reasons Why We Need to End the War on Drugs, 
BUS. INSIDER (July 12, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/32-reasons-why-
we-need-to-end-the-war-on-drugs-2012-7?op=1/#e-war-on-drugs-is-insanely-expensive-1 
[https://perma.cc/X8YQ-P78J]. 
11  Grace Wyler, Mass Incarceration in America, VICE (July 25, 2014, 7:15 AM), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mass-incarceration-in-america [https://perma.cc/YZQ4-
RXZV]. 
12  Erik Kain, The War on Drugs is a War on Minorities and the Poor, FORBES (June 28, 
2011, 10:07 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2011/06/28/the-war-on-drugs-is-a-
war-on-minorities-and-the-poor/ [https://perma.cc/8KC5-BMNC]. 
13  Jeffrey Miron & Katherine Waldock, The Budgetary Impact of Ending Drug Prohibition, 
CATO INST. (Sept. 27, 2010), https://www.cato.org/publications/white-paper/budgetary-impa 
ct-ending-drug-prohibition [https://perma.cc/795W-5QDJ]. 
14  Jay Stooksberry, Want to Reduce Gun Violence? Halt the War on Drugs, NEWSWEEK 
(Aug. 16, 2016, 6:30 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/want-reduce-gun-violence-halt-war-
drugs-488879 [https://perma.cc/4GJM-TJVG]. 
15  Jack Cole, End the Prohibition of Heroin: A Cop’s Experience Tells Him the Drug War Is 
Doing More Harm Than Good, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/ 
opinion/2014/08/24/end-prohibition-heroin/GRq3TO2RwX3IWDYTjY8UPO/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZTV7-W3J5]. 
16  Nicole Flatow, Drug Prohibition Stifles Medical, Scientific Advances, Researchers Find, 
THINKPROGRESS (June 12, 2013, 9:30 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/drug-prohibition-stifles-
medical-scientific-advances-researchers-find-8a76c4d85216/ [https://perma.cc/9VES-VH 
2W]. 
17  Anthony Papa, The War on Drugs: Voter Suppression by Another Name, DAILY KOS 
(Apr. 29, 2015, 2:16 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/4/29/1380986/-The-War-on-
Drugs-Voter-Suppression-by-Another-Name [https://perma.cc/RFB9-8A4Q]. 
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portunities.18 To this non-exhaustive list of arguments in favor of ending the 
War on Drugs, we must also add preservation of the Sixth Amendment. 
Public defenders across America struggle to provide the effective counsel 
mandated by the Constitution.19 In many instances, the restricted supply of pub-
lic service attorneys also lack the resources necessary to manage their assigned 
caseload in a manner consistent with the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
counsel.20 An overwhelming demand on these public defenders arises from 
criminal drug charges, collectively known as the War on Drugs.21 As Peter 
Rodino, former chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, expressed thirty 
years ago, “[w]e have been fighting the war on drugs, but now it seems to me 
the attack is on the Constitution of the United States.”22 
This Note suggests an unsurprising solution to the many problems sur-
rounding the constitutional intersects of the War on Drugs and the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective counsel. Part I offers a brief history of the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective counsel to refresh memories of the critical role 
public defender offices play in our judicial system. Part II outlines recent public 
defender statistics and case studies that illuminate the severity of today’s public 
defense supply crisis. Part III reveals how the immense demand of the War on 
Drugs directly and indirectly restrains public defense. Part IV examines the ad-
ditional complexities and conflicts resulting from the evolving state of drug 
laws and policies that negatively affect public defense. Part V explores the top-
ics of drug laws and public defense in light of the federalist principle of states’ 
rights. 
Finally, the Conclusion asserts that the War on Drugs’s demand on the lim-
ited public defense supply results in systemic Sixth Amendment violations ad-
dressed by a simple solution rooted in federalism. Specifically, the United 
States should re-schedule substances to remove federal prohibitions and allow 
states to more freely experiment with their drug policies and criminal justice 
systems. Should states desire to continue the War on Drugs within their border, 
they still must be held accountable for providing the effective counsel required 
by the Constitution, otherwise their proscriptive drug laws should be stricken as 
unconstitutional. Further, the federal government can establish a national posi-
tion by regulating the transport of substances across borders and conditioning 
funds to states for public defense and law enforcement based upon compliance 
with federal recommendations. Doing so would marry drug laws and public de-
                                                        
18  Daniel Indiviglio, Would Ending The Drug War Stimulate Economic Growth?, ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 8, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/02/would-ending-the-
drug-war-stimulate-economic-growth/35524/ [https://perma.cc/W3CR-X36X]. 
19  See infra Part II. 
20  Id. 
21  See infra Part III. 
22  Steven Wisotsky, Policy Analysis No. 180: A Society of Suspects: The War on Drugs and 
Civil Liberties, CATO INST. (Oct. 2, 1992), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analy 
sis/society-suspects-war-drugs-civil-liberties [https://perma.cc/PU32-2SCQ]. 
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fense under complementary, federalist principles instead of imposing upon 
states a standard shackled by national policies and underfunding. 
I. HISTORY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL 
 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence.”23 Courts maintain a duty to assign counsel 
when the accused is unable to employ counsel of their own choosing.24 An ina-
bility to employ counsel due to indigence requires the court to assign counsel 
for all federal prosecutions.25 Originally a guarantee only for federal offenses, 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel now extends to many state criminal 
prosecutions as well.26 Specifically, the Supreme Court first extended Sixth 
Amendment protections to state capital cases,27 then to state felony cases,28 and 
finally to state misdemeanors in which the accused faces potential jail time.29 
Further, the Supreme Court established a test to determine when the assistance 
of counsel is so ineffective that it still violates the Sixth Amendment right.30 
Additionally, surrounding circumstances can make a trial so inherently unfair 
as to justify a presumption of ineffective counsel without requiring an inquiry 
into actual performance.31 
A. Counsel for Capital Cases 
 The infamous “Scottsboro Boys” trial first established the court’s duty to 
ensure counsel for the accused under extreme circumstances.32 Nine African 
Americans from Tennessee accused in Alabama of raping two white women 
were “appointed all the members” of the local bar.33 However, no individual 
lawyer was named or designated to actually represent the accused until the 
morning of the one-day trial.34 On appeal, after the accused were found guilty 
and sentenced to death, the Supreme Court reversed.35 Due to the overall cir-
                                                        
23  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
24  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 59–60 (1932). 
25  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 459, 468 (1938). 
26  The 6th Amendment is incorporated via the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law.”). 
27  Powell, 287 U.S. at 73. 
28  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336–37, 342–43 (1963). 
29  Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
30  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 
31  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984). 
32  Powell, 287 U.S. at 73; see also Matthew C. Heise, The Scottsboro Boys Trials and Judge 
Horton’s Ex Parte Meeting: History’s Verdict, 7 DARTMOUTH L.J. 208, 208–09 (2009). 
33  Powell, 287 U.S. at 56. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. at 73. 
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cumstances surrounding the case—the defendants’ youth and illiteracy, a hos-
tile public audience, lack of nearby support from any family or friends, and the 
looming penalty of death—the necessity of counsel was held to be so vital that 
failing to make an effective appointment was a denial of due process.36 Howev-
er, the Court at this point did not yet answer whether the right to assigned coun-
sel in this manner for indigent defendants extended to non-capital cases.37 
B. Counsel for Federal Cases 
 Five years after the Scottsboro trial, the Supreme Court mandated appoint-
ed counsel for all federal prosecutions where the accused neither obtained 
counsel nor waived their Sixth Amendment right to counsel.38 Like the Scotts-
boro nine, the accused in Johnson v. Zerbst lacked education, funds, and nearby 
family and friends, but these defendants were charged with a non-capital of-
fense.39 The Court pointed to the “humane policy of the modern criminal law” 
as providing indigent defendants with appointed counsel in all federal criminal 
proceedings.40 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a necessary safeguard 
against unjust or arbitrary deprivation of the fundamental rights of life and lib-
erty.41 The Court declared the Sixth Amendment to be a constant admonition 
that justice will not be done if this safeguard is lost.42 
C. Counsel for State Felony Cases 
 Next, the landmark Gideon v. Wainwright extended the right of appointed 
counsel for indigent defendants in all state felony cases.43 Under Florida state 
law at the time, a court could only appoint counsel for a defendant charged with 
a capital offense.44 As Gideon was charged with breaking and entering with an 
intent to commit larceny, the judge denied the defendant’s request for legal as-
sistance, leaving Gideon to act as his own counsel.45 The Supreme Court re-
versed Gideon’s guilty judgment and proclaimed the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporated to the states the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel as a 
fundamental right essential to a fair trial.46 
                                                        
36  Id. at 71. 
37  See id. at 73. 
38  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467–68 (1938). 
39  See id. at 459. 
40  Id. at 463. 
41  Id. at 462. 
42  Id. 
43  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339, 342 (1963). 
44  Id. at 337. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. at 344–45. 
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D. Counsel for All Potential Incarceration 
A decade after Gideon, the Supreme Court further broadened Sixth 
Amendment protections to include state misdemeanors in which the accused 
faces jail time.47 Jon Argersinger, an unrepresented indigent defendant charged 
in Florida with carrying a concealed weapon, faced potential imprisonment of 
up to six months for a misdemeanor.48 Florida found Argersinger guilty, but the 
Supreme Court overturned the conviction, rejecting the argument that the Sixth 
Amendment intended to retract the right to counsel in petty offenses still pun-
ishable by imprisonment.49 In what the Court termed “assembly-line justice” 
due to hasty adjudication of the high volume of misdemeanor cases, the Court 
acknowledged that inadequate attention is frequently given to the defendant, 
thus endangering the fundamental right to a fair trial. 50  
Additionally, the Argersinger Court announced the need for counsel at the 
plea stage.51 An unrepresented defendant is less likely to be fully aware of the 
prospect of being incarcerated or being treated fairly by prosecutors.52 As a re-
sult, an accused that lacks counsel may not know precisely what entering a 
guilty plea entails.53 
Similarly, the Supreme Court has concluded that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel applies to all “critical stage[s]” after formal charges are filed in 
criminal prosecutions,54 such as: arraignments,55 post-indictment interroga-
tions,56 post-indictment pretrial lineups,57 preliminary hearings,58 the accused’s 
first appearance in front of a judicial officer after a formal charge is made,59 
and the first appeal of a defendant’s right,60 including the first-tier of discre-
tionary appeals.61 Finally, the Court held the Sixth Amendment mandates that 
each of these critical stages requires “effective” assistance of counsel,62 a topic 
discussed next. 
                                                        
47  Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972). 
48  Id. at 26. 
49  Id. at 30–31. 
50  Id. at 36. 
51  Id. at 34. 
52  Id. 
53  Id. 
54  Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972). 
55  Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961). 
56  Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
57  United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967). 
58  Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970). 
59  Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 194 (2008). 
60  Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393–94 (1985). 
61  Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 606 (2005). 
62  Lafler v. Cooper 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012). 
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E. Standard for Ineffective Counsel 
In Strickland, the Supreme Court determined the assistance of counsel 
could be so ineffective that it violates the Sixth Amendment.63 For a Sixth 
Amendment violation premised on ineffective assistance of counsel to warrant 
reversal, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that his counsel’s 
deficiency led to a different result in the proceeding.64 Continuing, a reasonable 
probability is one sufficient to undermine public confidence in the outcome.65 
With an ultimate focus on fairness, courts should be concerned whether a result 
is unreliable due to a breakdown in the adversarial process on which our justice 
system relies to produce just results.66 With the right to counsel recognized as 
the right to effective counsel, it follows that simply appointing a lawyer to be 
present at trial for the accused is not enough to satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee.67 
F. Presumption of Ineffective Counsel 
On the same day Strickland was decided, the Supreme Court held in United 
States v. Cronic that surrounding circumstances can “justify a presumption of 
ineffectiveness.”68 With this presumption, a Sixth Amendment claim can be 
sufficient even without an evaluation of counsel’s actual performance.69 The 
Court reasoned that surrounding circumstances may be of such magnitude that 
the likelihood of any lawyer, competent or otherwise, providing effective coun-
sel is so diminutive that a presumption of ineffectiveness is appropriate.70 
The aforementioned Scottsboro case was highlighted as a model example 
where surrounding circumstances made the trial so inherently unfair as to war-
rant a presumption of ineffectiveness without evaluation of actual perfor-
mance.71 The Cronic Court reminded that the Scottsboro defendants were des-
ignated counsel in a manner “so indefinite or so close upon the trial as to 
amount to a denial of effective and substantial aid.”72 However, the Court re-
fused to create a per se rule of circumstances that would give rise to the pre-
sumption of ineffectiveness.73 
                                                        
63  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 
64  Id. at 694. 
65  Id. 
66  Id. at 696. 
67  Id. at 685–86. 
68  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984). 
69  Id. 
70  Id. at 659–60. 
71  Id. at 660–61. 
72  Id. at 660. 
73  Id. at 661. 
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II. CRISIS: STRUGGLING STATES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE 
In 2013, the 50th anniversary of Gideon, former Attorney General Eric 
Holder described the current state of public defense as one in crisis.74 In a cen-
sus of twenty-two states between 1999 and 2007, the caseload of public de-
fenders increased an average of 20 percent while the number of public defend-
ers increased by only 4 percent.75 The extreme shortfall between the supply of 
public defense resources versus the caseload demand produces startling results, 
such as the public defenders assigned to New Orleans misdemeanor courts that 
are afforded an average of seven minutes for each client.76 
With limited public defenders, pretrial detainees awaiting representation 
clog the jails, judges are unable to clear dockets, detention costs rise, and, ulti-
mately, states face a Constitutional crisis for failing to provide the Sixth 
Amendment counsel necessary for a fair trial.77 Many states—including New 
York, Louisiana, California, Idaho, Pennsylvania, and Utah—have already 
been sued over such Constitutional violations.78 
The recent crop of systemic challenges follow the lead of Hurrell-Harring 
v. State of New York, in which twenty indigent plaintiffs argued that New 
York’s failure to adequately fund and staff their public defense offices violated 
the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.79 Citing Cronic, New York’s 
highest court held that plaintiffs can bring Sixth Amendment claims over the 
surrounding circumstances of systemic deficiencies in public defense, which 
lead to severe adversarial imbalances and breed unreliable judgments.80 Ulti-
mately, Hurrell-Harring settled before trial when the state agreed to fully fund 
and staff indigent defense in the five defendant counties.81 In the remainder of 
this Part, I examine four states primed for systemic Sixth Amendment violation 
suits due to a deficient supply of public defense resources for their indigent cli-
ent demand. 
                                                        
74  Dylan Walsh, On the Defensive, ATLANTIC (June 2, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/on-the-defensive/485165/ [https://perm 
a.cc/2SZF-ZV5T]. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  Lorelei Laird, Starved of Money for Too Long, Public Defender Offices Are Suing—and 
Starting to Win, ABA J. (Jan. 1, 2017, 4:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/arti 
cle/the_gideon_revolution/ [https://perma.cc/2XSL-UJNN]. 
79  Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 217 (N.Y. 2010). 
80  Id. at 225–28. 
81  Laird, supra note 78. 
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A. Down in the Bayou 
In New Orleans, Louisiana, 85 percent of cases involve an indigent client 
unable to afford counsel and are thus reliant on public defenders.82 However, 
because so few attorneys are available after a budget cut forced a hiring freeze, 
the public defender’s office began denying serious felony cases and created an 
indefinite wait list.83 As of May 2016, the wait list still numbered in the hun-
dreds even after 348 cases were refused.84 Will Snowden, one public defender 
with a lightened caseload thanks to the wait list, expressed gratitude about be-
ing able to provide more effective counsel, but lamented the cost: 
It’s at the price of people sitting in jail for three months, two months, four 
months, whatever it may be, without a lawyer. And I hate for that to be the cost 
of doing better work for the clients that I have, but then there are clients who 
nobody is doing any work for. And that’s where the injustice lies, that these 
people, case, their defense is literally just passing away with the passing of 
time.85 
However, after seven waitlisted indigents brought a habeas corpus petition 
claiming the wait list violated their Constitutional rights, a judge ordered the 
release of the men pending state appeal.86 The court wrote, “The defendants’ 
constitutional rights are not contingent on budget demands, waiting lists and the 
failure of the Legislature to adequately fund indigent defense.”87 
 Louisiana’s public defense crisis is not limited to the unique metropolitan 
concerns of New Orleans. As of April 2016, thirty-three of Louisiana’s forty-
two public defender offices were maintaining wait lists or refusing cases be-
cause of staffing and budget shortfalls combined with extremely high case-
loads.88 More drastically, the Plaquemines Public Defenders Office announced 
it would be furloughing its lawyers and shutting down due to a lack of funds to 
meet the demands of its parish.89 As a result, more defendants were left without 
counsel and moved to a wait list.90 Statewide, thousands sit in jail with no fore-
seeable legal counsel.91 
                                                        
82  Mori Rothman, Wait List Grows as Public Defenders Refuse Cases in New Orleans, PBS: 
NEWSHOUR (May 1, 2016, 5:13 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/wait-list-grows-as-
public-defenders-refuse-cases-in-new-orleans/ [https://perma.cc/GSQ2-FVEG]. 
83  Id. 
84  Lauren Zanolli, Louisiana’s Public Defender Crisis Is Leaving Thousands Stuck in Jail 
with No Legal Help, VICE NEWS (May 13, 2016, 10:20 AM), https://news.vice.com/article/ 
louisianas-public-defender-crisis-is-leaving-thousands-stuck-in-jail-with-no-legal-help 
[https://perma.cc/7Y4L-H7ME]. 
85  Rothman, supra note 82. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  Zanolli, supra note 84. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  Della Hasselle, A Public Defense Crisis in Louisiana: 33 of 42 Public Defenders’ Offices 
Restricting Client Services Due to Funding Shortfalls, GAMBIT (May 25, 2016, 3:49 PM), 
18 NEV. L.J. 229, GIDDENS - FINAL  12/15/17  4:34 PM 
Fall 2017] UNSHACKLING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 239 
B. Tarnished Golden Standard 
Similarly, public defenders in Fresno County, California, are so overbur-
dened by crushing caseloads that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
filed a lawsuit against California and Fresno County alleging inadequate repre-
sentation violating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.92 In Fresno County, 
public defenders are assigned up to four times the recommended client num-
ber.93 As a result, attorneys rarely have time to discuss the basic circumstances 
of their client’s arrest or evidence for an effective defense.94 
One of the lawsuit’s plaintiffs, Peter Yepez, spent nearly a month in jail be-
fore seeing a public defender.95 Yepez then bounced through nine separate pub-
lic defenders between the time of his initial arraignment and final sentencing; 
some of these public defenders told Yepez they did not have enough time for 
his case and then advised him to plead guilty despite strong exculpatory evi-
dence.96 Emma Andersson, a Staff Attorney for ACLU’s Criminal Law Reform 
Project, commented, “The presumption of innocence is the keystone of our 
criminal justice system, and it is profoundly compromised for the most vulner-
able defendants when the public defense system is failing.”97 Even Fresno 
County’s District Attorney condemned the public defense crisis as “bog[ging] 
down the entire justice system.”98 
C. Show Me the Money 
In Missouri, the crisis reached a point where the Public Defender Director 
sued his own Governor over funding restrictions that further burdened the 
state’s public defenders.99 In 2014, the American Bar Association (ABA) re-
leased a study of Missouri’s Public Defender System that concluded a 75 per-
cent increase in the number of public defenders was needed just to reach a basic 
level of quality for the number of cases.100 Despite these results, Governor Jay 
Nixon, formerly Missouri’s Attorney General, repeatedly vetoed and blocked 
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beneficial measures like caseload caps and additional funding, both of which 
would have lessened the burden facing state public defenders.101 Not to be out-
done, Public Defender Director, Michael Barrett, exercised a state provision 
that allowed him to draft Governor Nixon—a member of the Missouri Bar—as 
a lawyer to take over a case for an indigent client.102 In a notification letter to 
the Governor, Barrett began by reminding Nixon that his Governor’s office ve-
toed relief to overburdened public defenders in an indigent defense system op-
erating under significant stresses while ranked 49th in the nation in terms of 
funding.103 
Unfortunately, Louisiana, California, and Missouri are indicative of—not 
exceptions to—a nationwide crisis.104 Norman Lefstein, an expert in indigent 
defense and dean emeritus at McKinney School of Law at Indiana University, 
acknowledged that the situation in Louisiana is not unusual because the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective counsel is breached every day the courts are in 
session all over the United States.105 Similar to the suit against Fresno County, 
the ACLU has brought actions against Idaho, New York, Washington, Michi-
gan, and Louisiana, alleging systemic failures to provide effective counsel.106 
D. Born to Battle 
Finally, in Nevada, a 2013 study by the Sixth Amendment Center conclud-
ed that serious problems exist, especially in rural areas of the state, ensuring 
counsel for poor individuals facing a potential loss of liberty.107 Specifically, 
“[t]he indigent accused may sit in jail for several weeks or even months, wait-
ing to speak to an attorney.”108 Once the state does appoint counsel, that de-
fendant is likely to be one of several hundred other defendants vying for the at-
tention of that same attorney at the same time.109 Addressing the systemic 
deficiencies in Nevada’s current ability to meet the Constitutional requirements 
of the Sixth Amendment and Gideon, Nevada Supreme Court Justice Michael 
Cherry stated, “Nevada’s rural counties simply cannot shoulder the state’s obli-
gations under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution any longer.”110 
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This statement becomes even more devastating in light of a single fact concern-
ing Nevada’s longstanding history of ensuring justice equality for the poor. 
Almost one hundred years before Gideon, Nevada became the first state in the 
nation to appoint attorneys for all criminal matters, including misdemeanors, 
making it one of the bedrock principles upon which the state established its 
identity.111 
Before moving on to examine factors that significantly feed the public de-
fense crisis, just a quick reminder that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
right to effective counsel is to protect all individuals against potential govern-
mental tyranny by ensuring that the least financially secure among us are pro-
tected. As Jonathan Rapping, president and founder of the Gideon’s Promise 
advocacy organization noted, “If we believe in equal justice, then the single 
most important thing to do is make sure poor people have the kinds of lawyers 
richer people would have.”112 Yet, Gideon’s promise of effective counsel does 
not just encompass providing lawyers of comparable skills and abilities. The 
surrounding circumstances must also allow these highly competent, knowl-
edgeable, and passionate public defenders the opportunity and resources to 
provide the zealous advocacy necessary to comply with the Sixth Amendment. 
Still, increasing the potential for “rich people” public defenders by expanding 
the pool of full-time public defenders does, at least, partly address the supply 
side of the burden equation. 
Unfortunately, estimates based upon recommended caseload maximums 
for public defenders reveal that almost 7,000 more public defenders are needed 
just to address the current caseload.113 In the meantime, current public defend-
ers face a reality where “[t]here isn’t time to uncover the facts, to marinate in 
them, to do the research necessary,” according to Derrick Carson, Chief Public 
Defender in Concordia Parish, Louisiana.114 Even more unsettling is Carson’s 
ultimate characterization of the entire scenario: “It becomes like herding cat-
tle.”115 Keep this dehumanization of indigent defendants to lower-than-second-
class citizens in mind as we turn next to the demand side of the defense burden 
equation. 
III. SHACKLES: DRUG LAWS RESTRAIN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC DEFENSE 
In a familiar refrain, a 1990 article exploring the War on Drugs’s impact on 
the courts quoted District Judge Lucius Benton of Texas as saying they were 
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“just running them through here like cattle.”116 At that time, “the number of 
drug cases [had already] increased by 270 percent” over the previous decade.117 
This staggering explosion in volume left judges and lawyers—both defense and 
prosecution—attributing to the War on Drugs the “unintended consequences” 
of overwhelming public defenders, substantially shifting the balance of power 
to prosecutors, and “impairing the quality of justice.”118 
The demand from drug cases both directly and indirectly restrains the abil-
ity of public defenders to provide the effective counsel the Constitution man-
dates, while deferred resources reinforce the disparity shackles on public de-
fenders against their better-supplied prosecutorial adversaries. The direct 
restraint manifests in the overwhelming number of cases involving indigent cli-
ents charged with drug offenses, a situation abetted by vastly disproportionate 
drug law enforcement against the poor, i.e. those less able to afford counsel and 
who thus need public defender assistance.119 Indirectly, public defense is re-
strained by a limited-resource judicial system taxed at every point of admin-
istration with diminished time for critical stages such as plea-bargaining.120 Fi-
nally, the time, effort, and funds spent elsewhere—whether on law 
enforcement, prisons and other corrections, or especially the prosecution—are 
all resources unavailable to alleviate the public defense crisis and thus enable 
the adversarial advantage.121 
A. The Direct Restraint of Increased Caseloads 
One restraint on effective public defense is the seemingly endless number 
of individuals charged with low-level offenses—such as drug violations—
whom public defenders are most frequently called upon to represent.122 Na-
tionwide, public defenders represent 80 percent of criminal defendants,123 and 
drug violations constitute the single highest category of arrests with a new ar-
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rest made every twenty-one seconds.124 This rate produces approximately one 
and a half million drug arrests each year.125 Over 80 percent of these drug viola-
tions are for simple possession, and half of those are for marijuana.126 Regard-
ing their share of the total number of arrests for all offenses, drugs crimes in-
creased from less than 4 percent in 1973 to almost 14 percent in 2015.127 
 Incarceration statistics also clearly illuminate the War on Drugs’s expand-
ing contribution to the criminal caseload weight. First, while the number of 
criminal offenders within each major category of offenses increased between 
1995 and 2003, the number incarcerated for drug offenses accounted for the 
single largest percentage of the growth.128 Of the 1,316,409 people serving a 
sentence in a state prison at the end of 2014, over 200,000 of these prisoners 
had a drug charge as their most serious offense.129 Among those serving time in 
a United States federal prison on the date of September 30, 2015, a drug of-
fense was the most serious charge for almost half of all inmates.130 
 The arrest and incarceration statistics become even more striking when 
combined with the knowledge that public defenders have seen their share of the 
total caseload increase as well. The share of felons in large counties who used 
public defenders increased between 1992 and 1996 from 59 percent to 68 per-
cent.131 To remind, public defenders represent about 80 percent of all criminal 
defendants nationwide.132 Although white-collar crimes have seen their defend-
ants represented by private counsel to a higher degree, public defenders repre-
sent a higher percentage of drug offenders.133 Continuing, the National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers reported there were over 10,000,000 
misdemeanor prosecutions in 2006 alone.134 Again, the vast majority of these 
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defendants needed the assistance of an effective public defender because they 
could not afford private counsel of their own.135 
Prosecutors nationally are also overburdened with excessive caseloads, yet, 
in a perverse twist, an overburdened state further detriments the defense.136 
Prosecutors are unable to timely bring cases to trial, resulting in many defend-
ants remaining incarcerated for months or even years if they are unable to post 
bail.137 The oft-terrible incarceration conditions then lead defendants to accept 
less-than-favorable plea bargains than what might be afforded with a timely tri-
al and effective counsel.138 Even worse, some who are innocent of the crimes 
for which they are accused plead guilty just to end their incarceration.139 
B. The Indirect Restraint of a Taxed System 
The War on Drugs impacts the entire criminal justice system by taxing the 
stretched-thin resources at every stage in the process, from arrest to adjudica-
tion, and incarceration to post-release supervision.140 Jeff Whitacre, Commis-
sioner of an Ohio county whose Public Defender Office handled 2 percent more 
cases in 2014 than 2013—a year which saw the all-time high number of cases 
for the office—correctly remarked that the public defender is one of many 
branches in the judicial system feeling the weight of the War on Drugs.141 
One of the critical stages adversely affected by this pressure from the War 
on Drugs is plea-bargaining. With almost 90 percent of criminal defendants 
ending their cases by pleading guilty without a full trial, the primary justifica-
tion for seeking bargains is typically said to be efficiently minimizing stress on 
both the process and the players in the criminal justice system.142 However, 
critics argue that plea bargains give an unfair advantage to prosecutors who use 
it as a tool to undermine the Sixth Amendment.143 Many prosecutors strong-arm 
drug defendants with coercive tactics that put an enormous pressure on them to 
accept a plea offer they cannot afford to refuse.144 The historically low rate of 
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federal drug defendants going to trial—only 3 percent—likely reflects an un-
balanced criminal justice system fertile for systemic ineffective assistance of 
counsel.145 When the Argersinger Court extended the Sixth Amendment right 
to effective counsel to include the critical pleading stage, the Court noted that 
the volume of cases “may create an obsession for speedy dispositions, regard-
less of the fairness of the result.”146 
 Ultimately, the focus on nonviolent, low-level offenses like drug posses-
sion clogs the criminal justice system and diverts criminal justice resources, es-
pecially from public defenders.147 Although representing these drug-charge cli-
ents often does not individually consume much time, cumulatively the sheer 
volume of cases taxes resources on a systemic level.148 While each case remains 
open, public defenders, prosecutors, judges, and other judicial officers attend 
arraignments and other hearings, negotiate pleas, file and argue motions, and 
complete any other necessary work to manage the assembly-line of concurrent 
cases.149 As stated in a 2013 paper published by the Brennan Center for Justice 
for the 50th anniversary of Gideon, “simple possession of drugs may be the 
most frequent charge that saps public defense and other criminal justice re-
sources. . . .”150 
C. The Adversarial Restraint of Deferred Resources 
Finally, the War on Drugs deepens the chasm between the financial re-
sources potentially available for public defense versus those accessible to the 
prosecution by displacing funds to criminalize—instead of understanding and 
treating—drug use, abuse, and addiction.151 The Drug Policy Alliance estimates 
that, over a four-decade period, taxpayers in America have spent one trillion 
dollars on the War on Drugs.152 When accounting for state and local spending, 
the annual cost reaches over fifty billion dollars.153 Meanwhile, the lack of 
funds available for public defenders restrains their ability to conduct basic in-
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vestigations or employ expert witnesses, both of which are necessary for an ef-
fective defense.154 
The obscene amount spent on the War on Drugs does not appear to be 
sound policy in light of the difficulties faced by public defenders in providing 
effective counsel, especially against disproportionally better-funded prosecu-
tions. The total spending of state prosecutors exceeded that of public defenders 
by over three billion dollars in 2007 alone.155 In California, the annual budget 
for prosecutors was about three hundred million dollars more than for public 
defenders.156 Additionally, as of 2008, American taxpayers spent fourteen times 
more on corrections than on public defense.157 
 Perhaps even more distressing, the financial windfall of prosecutors over 
their public defense adversaries persists in the face of more cost-effective alter-
natives to addressing concerns surrounding illicit drugs.158 For example, treat-
ing drug addiction within communities is considered to be a very cost-effective 
way to prevent crimes.159 The cost of incarceration exceeds the more humane 
approach of treatment by approximately twenty thousand dollars per person per 
year.160 Further, the Washington State Institute for Public Policy produced a 
study that found that every dollar spent on drug treatment yielded almost twen-
ty dollars in savings related to crime in the community.161 On the other hand, 
prisons were found to yield only thirty-seven cents in public safety per every 
dollar spent.162 
 Knowing the public defense struggle to achieve the Constitutionally-
mandated standard of effective counsel, the financial disadvantage public de-
fenders face against their State adversaries, and policymakers’ reckless aban-
don towards prioritizing the more-costly and less-effective path of punishment 
over treatment, one must pause to question the War on Drugs’s true intent. In 
his article on the erosion of a range of civil liberties under the War on Drugs, 
Paul Finkelman did not mince words: “The whole conduct of the war on drugs 
appears to be aimed at crippling the defense capabilities of the accused.”163 
Finkelman observed that, although public defenders are highly knowledgeable 
about criminal law, their offices are so underfunded and overworked that they 
are rarely likely to have the proper resources necessary to defend the indigent 
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accused against the government.164 Moving forward, this troubling situation 
will only worsen as the War on Drugs continues.165 
IV. CONFLICT: ADMINISTRATION OF AN EVOLVING WAR ON DRUGS 
Drug laws and policies within the United States at both the state and the 
federal level are in constant flux. In the 2016 elections, four states (California, 
Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada) voted to legalize adult recreational mariju-
ana.166 An additional four states (Arkansas, Florida, Montana, and North Dako-
ta) voted to approve marijuana for medicinal purposes.167 Marijuana’s sole bal-
lot measure defeat of the election season occurred in Arizona, whose citizens 
narrowly declined to expand their medicinal allowance to adult recreation.168 
As a result, more than half the states and the District of Columbia currently 
have laws legalizing marijuana, whether for recreation or solely for medicinal 
purposes.169 
A. Past and Present Evolutions 
Despite the moves by individual states to decriminalize marijuana, the Su-
preme Court held that Congress may still criminalize the production and use of 
homegrown marijuana as a federal offense even when states allow the legal use 
for medicinal purposes.170 Further, the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) announced in 2016 that marijuana will remain classified as a Schedule I 
drug under the Controlled Substance Act.171 One effect of such classification 
requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to declare that marijuana has 
no medical use.172 Thus, states that allow medicinal use—or even legal recrea-
tional use—of marijuana do so in defiance of federal law.173 Additionally, phy-
sicians who prescribe medicinal marijuana to patients struggling with the pains 
of terminal illnesses in states that allow this treatment are also in violation of 
federal law.174 
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However, the Ninth Circuit recently held that federal judges should stop 
prosecutions for conduct authorized in state medical marijuana laws by enforc-
ing section 542 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act.175 The court an-
nounced that section 542 prohibits the Department of Justice (DOJ) from 
spending funds on “actions that prevent the Medical Marijuana States’ giving 
practical effect to their state laws that authorize the use, distribution, posses-
sion, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”176 Still, this decision comes from on-
ly a single federal circuit. Not coincidentally, seven of the nine states within the 
Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, including more than half of the nation’s recreation-
al marijuana states, allow conditional marijuana use.177 
 This conflict between federal and state law generates cases that stress an 
already stretched-thin judicial system in which public defense gets the short re-
source stick. In addition to scenarios of the type mentioned above, the potential 
for absurd dilemmas became apparent in a recent congressional hearing on the 
potential complications of decriminalizing marijuana possession in the District 
of Columbia, a city policed by both federal and local law enforcement agen-
cies.178 The subcommittee asked whether, under the proposed decriminaliza-
tion, a marijuana possessor with one foot on city property and another on feder-
al property would be punished under state or federal law.179 The Assistant Chief 
of D.C.’s Metropolitan Police Department stated that he would enforce state 
law, which makes possession of less than one ounce of marijuana subject to a 
$25 civil fine post-decriminalization.180 On the other hand, the Acting Chief of 
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the United States Park Police stated that he would enforce federal law, which 
makes the same possession a jailable offense with a potential $5000 fine.181 
Likewise, the federal-versus-state conflict produces non-criminal litigation, 
which, again, compounds the overall burden on the judicial system as a 
whole.182 For example, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled against Colorado cit-
izen Brandon Coats in his wrongful termination suit against his former employ-
er, Dish Network.183 Dish Network, which is headquartered in Colorado, fired 
Coats for his legal use of marijuana despite Colorado’s “lawful” activities stat-
ute which prohibits employers from firing employees based upon engagement 
in lawful activities off company property during nonworking hours.184 The 
Colorado state court held that this Colorado statute did not protect a Colorado 
citizen abiding by Colorado laws because federal laws rendered the lawful ac-
tivity as unlawful.185 Adding insult to injury, Coats is a quadriplegic registered 
for medical marijuana, and only used the substance at home, outside of working 
hours.186 
Further, the ongoing development, understanding, and opinions of existing 
drugs, as well as the frequent creation of new drugs, will only add to the con-
flict inherent in a system where the federal government can proscribe this type 
of private activity that individual states allow. For example, recent research 
suggests that lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), which is categorized as a 
Schedule I Controlled Substance with no accepted medical use in the United 
States, may in fact offer positive, medicinal purposes.187 At the other end of the 
spectrum, dangers surrounding synthetic marijuana—which goes by a variety 
of other names, like “spice” and “K2”—raise the same fears and motivations in 
the War on Drugs, which, in turn, leads to federal criminalization, and thus an 
increase in the caseload demand on public defense.188 Synthetic drugs also add 
additional legal nuance and complexity, as manufacturers can sometimes avoid 
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prosecution by tweaking formulas and switching to varieties that are not exact-
ly illegal.189 
Recently, much attention has been directed towards kratom, a pain-
relieving plant from Southeast Asia, with parallels drawn between it and mari-
juana.190 Though some claim that kratom is effective in battling opioid addic-
tions,191 others express concern regarding kratom’s own addictive properties 
and other health-related dangers.192 In a familiar refrain, the DEA announced its 
intent to categorize the active materials in the plant as Schedule I substances 
because kratom “has a high potential for abuse, has no currently accepted med-
ical use in treatment in the United States, and has a lack of accepted safety for 
use under medical supervision.”193 Should the DEA decide to effectively make 
kratom federally illegal, its action would strip the states of their sovereign right 
to rule themselves, place non-conforming states in violation of federal law, and 
add weight to the overall caseload demand, even though individual states are 
already taking actions as they best see fit.194 
B. Administration Currently in Session(s) 
Adding an additional level of uncertainty, the 2016 Presidential election re-
sults brought a change in party—and thus, priorities—at the Executive branch 
with the victory of Donald Trump.195 Any transition at the top will result in at 
least marginal change and the proverbial growing pains therewith, though the 
swing’s magnitude increases greatly when not just the President, but the con-
trolling party also switches.196 Additionally, the current administration’s un-
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precedented nature generates an extra air of unpredictability and potential con-
flict.197 
Regardless, the history of Jeff Sessions, Attorney General of the United 
States—America’s top lawyer and chief law enforcement officer in charge of 
the DOJ—provides insight on the expected direction of drug policy over the 
next few years.198 Sessions is a staunch opponent of legalizing marijuana and 
criticized his predecessors at the DOJ for not vigorously enforcing the federal 
ban nationwide.199 When questioned at his Senate confirmation hearings about 
conflicts with state drug laws, Sessions evaded the issue by saying only that he 
would not commit to never enforcing federal law.200 
Drug policy reformers such as Ethan Nadelmann, the Executive Director at 
the Drug Policy Alliance, consider Sessions to be a nightmare for reform and 
someone who will more strictly enforce existing drug laws.201 Sessions’s recent 
action rescinding former President Obama’s memo to phase out the federal 
government’s use of private prisons justifies Nadelmann and other reformers’ 
concerns.202 This rescission likely began an expansive rollback of the more re-
laxed criminal justice policies enacted under the Obama administration, such as 
those directed against seeking mandatory minimums for nonviolent drug of-
fenders,203 and not challenging marijuana legalization in Colorado and Wash-
ington.204 Sessions further provided evidence of a justice policy reversal via his 
May, 2017, memo directing federal prosecutors to seek the most severe charges 
and sentences possible.205 
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On the same day as Sessions’s rescission of the Obama memo, White 
House Press Secretary Sean Spicer further confirmed the legitimacy of reform-
ers’ concerns by stating in a press conference that action on marijuana use is a 
question best suited for the DOJ.206 However, he also stated that he believes the 
United States will see “greater enforcement of it.”207 Lest we brush off such 
talk as hollow, Spicer also previously stated that the White House was “going 
to strip federal grant money from the sanctuary cities and states that harbor il-
legal immigrants.”208 Soon after this threat, President Trump signed an execu-
tive order that allows for exactly that to vindictively punish non-conforming 
cities and states.209 
But what exactly does President Trump think of drug laws and enforce-
ment? In the 90’s, Trump appeared to call for legalizing all drugs, though he 
has since expressed support only for medical marijuana.210 While campaigning 
as the Republican nominee, Trump stated that an administration under his 
watch would “do” medical marijuana.211 He also indicated that states would re-
tain authority to address the issue of legalization within their borders.212 How-
ever, he also said that Colorado now has “a lot of problems” as a result of de-
criminalizing marijuana.213 
V. DEFENSE: THE LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY 
The federalist principle of “states’ rights” implicates a simple yet sublime 
idea: within fifty laboratories of democracies, i.e. the fifty states in the Union, 
experimental ideas producing bad results can be tossed without damaging the 
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nation, while successful ones can be propagated and nationalized.214 Republi-
cans—the current dominant party—have enthusiastically supported states’ 
rights on a variety of issues.215 The more controversial topics debated in light of 
states’ rights to experiment range from voter identification216 to abortion217 to 
“transgender bathroom laws.”218 
This section explores the arguably less-controversial topics of marijuana 
prohibition and public defense in the light of federalism. First, the semi-
permissive federalism around marijuana laws sees positive experimentation re-
sults despite being stunted by prohibitive national drug laws and policies. Next, 
the forced federalism of public defense struggles under the current framework 
to produce the effective assistance of counsel the Sixth Amendment requires. 
The Conclusion which follows suggests a complimentary blending of the two 
inextricably-linked experiments. 
A. The Recreational Marijuana Experiment 
Despite what is said and done in and around Washington, D.C., both Colo-
rado and Washington already provide evidence of drug decriminalization’s pos-
itive impact in multiple arenas, including the judicial system.219 Most relevant 
to this Note are the specific benefits of unclogging the courts via fewer drug 
arrests, and financial gains through reduced costs and increased tax revenue.220 
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The results within these categories in the short time since Colorado and Wash-
ington legalized recreational marijuana are remarkable.221 
Looking first to Colorado, the Drug Policy Alliance released a comprehen-
sive report that provides data from the Judicial Branch of Colorado comparing 
marijuana charges and arrests before and after the 2012 passage of Amendment 
64, the state’s recreational marijuana bill.222 This report revealed that marijuana 
arrests drastically plummeted, as one would expect, in Colorado after the pas-
sage of Amendment 64, with marijuana-related charges decreasing by about 80 
percent.223 Additionally, and perhaps more surprising to some readers, all drug-
related charges—not just marijuana—decreased by 23 percent, which under-
scores the implications of marijuana legalization for general criminal justice 
reform.224 Currently, data tracking the direct effect of this dramatic decrease in 
drug charges on the caseloads of public defender offices in Colorado is una-
vailable. However, because drug violations categorically account for the largest 
portion of arrests in America,225 and public defenders take a higher percentage 
of drug cases,226 we can safely infer that Colorado public defenders have seen 
their caseload demand significantly lessened. 
In addition to the reduced costs of adjudicating eight thousand fewer mari-
juana cases per year, Colorado has also seen financial benefits in the form of 
tax revenue.227 Thanks to over one billion dollars in marijuana-related sales on 
the Colorado books for 2016, the state pulled in almost two hundred million 
dollars in tax revenue.228 “The system is working,” stated Mason Tvert, Com-
munications Director for the Marijuana Policy Project, regarding marijuana be-
ing properly tested, labeled, and legally sold to adults by licensed businesses 
instead of illicitly on the street.229 
Similarly, since Washington passed its recreational marijuana legislation, I-
502, marijuana sales have generated over eighty million dollars in tax revenue 
while the state saved millions previously wasted on arresting and punishing 
marijuana offenses.230 Specifically, filings in court for low-level marijuana of-
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fenses by adults dropped 98 percent in the time since voters approved the initia-
tive.231 Since each individual arrest and prosecution for marijuana possession 
costs Washington between one and two thousand dollars in police, prosecution, 
defense, and court expenses, the state is now saving millions of dollars simply 
by no longer adjudicating low-level marijuana offenses at the pre-initiative lev-
els.232 Meanwhile, additional data shows that violent crime rates declined over 
the same period, while traffic fatalities and youth rates remained steady.233 As a 
result, Washington voters continue to support their decision to legalize recrea-
tional marijuana.234 
On the same day that Secretary Spicer commented on seeing greater en-
forcement of federal prohibitions on medical marijuana, Quinnipiac University 
released a poll showing that 93 percent of those surveyed support medical mari-
juana and 59 percent support legalizing marijuana for recreational purposes in 
the United States.235 Additionally, the poll found that 71 percent of Americans 
oppose the enforcement of federal prohibition laws in those states where mari-
juana is legal, whether for medical or recreational use.236 Also of note, every 
demographic grouping in the poll supported this federalist position regarding 
marijuana laws.237 Based upon public opinion and the positive results examined 
for Colorado and Washington, the federal government should not frustrate the 
people’s will and instead defer to the concept that states maintain police power 
over laws that protect the welfare, safety, and health of individuals within their 
borders.238 
B. The Public Defense Experiment 
Because Gideon did not dictate exactly how governments must operate to 
ensure the Constitutional right to effective counsel, a “chaotic and patchwork 
landscape” of widely disparate methods and results emerged across the na-
tion.239 For example, states may use independent commissions, non-
independent commissions, partial commissions, or even no commissions to 
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administer and oversee their public defense systems.240 Additionally, state 
funding varies from 100 percent supported by the National Legal Aid & De-
fender Association (NLADA) and ABA criminal justice standards down all the 
way to 0 percent.241 Further, while some states maintain binding statewide or 
jurisdiction-specific workload standards, others adhere to non-binding work-
load suggestions or even no workload limits at all.242 Finally, some jurisdictions 
also contract out indigent clients to private attorneys, but the same restraints 
remain, if not amplified.243 
Regardless, one consistency does exist among all states: a shared absence 
of the federal funding they need to provide the effective assistance of counsel 
that the federal Constitution mandates.244 Because of this, only three reasonable 
paths exist for addressing the public defense crisis wherein state laws do not 
conflict with federal law. First, the federal government can drastically increase 
public defense funding as needed for states to deliver Constitutionally mandat-
ed effective assistance of counsel per the caseload demand generated with cur-
rent federal criminal laws and policies. Alternatively, the federal government 
can renege on its promise of Constitutionally protected individual liberties by 
redefining the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel to a lesser standard 
for the states. Or, third, the federal government can modify certain federal 
criminal laws and policies to reduce the caseload demand to levels where rea-
sonable funding enables public defenders in the states to provide the effective 
assistance of counsel required of them. Experimenting with this third option is 
likely the most fruitful and palatable route, even before we entered the current 
era of economic austerity and federal program cuts.245 
CONCLUSION 
The federal government shackles resource-strapped public defenders via 
the failed War on Drugs without supplying the funds necessary to provide ef-
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fective assistance of counsel as mandated by the United States Constitution. 
With a history of flexing authority over state marijuana laws,246 expectations of 
even greater enforcement,247 and threats of future de-funding as punishment for 
not conforming to executive mandates,248 the federal government unduly coerc-
es states into maintaining costly drug laws which generate demands they cannot 
afford to meet per Constitutional standards. 
As a result, the War on Drugs breeds a systemic violation of the Sixth 
Amendment by creating pervasive surrounding circumstances where the likeli-
hood of effective counsel is so diminutive, a presumption of ineffectiveness is 
appropriate. The argument that structural deficiencies created by the govern-
ment can cause systemic—not just individualized—Constitutional violations so 
severe to warrant extraordinary remedies is not a unique or novel idea.249 In 
fact, the ACLU’s complaint against Fresno County alleged that structural defi-
ciencies “systematically denied” indigent defendants their Constitutional right 
to effective counsel at every critical stage of the criminal process.250 Addition-
ally, because an estimated twenty-seven million Americans used illicit drugs in 
2014, the systemic violation created by the War on Drugs would reach an ab-
surd degree if states simply followed the path of strict, indiscriminate drug law 
enforcement.251 Instead, the United States should end federal drug prohibition 
and commit to repairing the structural deficiencies from the surrounding cir-
cumstances of the War on Drugs and which cause systemic Constitutional vio-
lations. 
 Though this Note’s Author suggests the best long-term solution to address-
ing the public defense crisis is to end the federal prohibition of every controlled 
substance in the manner described below, this Note focuses primarily on ending 
marijuana prohibition as the first major step. Three sets of facts beyond the 
many debated benefits of marijuana use justify this narrowing to the recom-
mended solution. First, marijuana accounts for the highest number of users and 
                                                        
246  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 6–15 (2005). 
247  Rampton et al., supra note 206. 
248  Text of Trump’s Executive Order on Interior Immigration Enforcement, supra note 209. 
249  See Brown v. Plata, 131 U.S. 1910, 1928–29 (2011) (holding that overcrowded Califor-
nia prisons violated the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment and order-
ing the release of around 46,000 convicted criminals to remedy the structural deficiency). 
250  Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Re-
lief Under Cal. Const. Art. I § 15, U.S Const. Amds. 6 and 14, Cal. Penal Code §§ 987, 




251  Sarra L. Hedden et al., Behavioral Health Trends in the United States: Results from the 
2014 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVICES ADMIN., Sept. 2015, at 1, https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-
FRR1-2014/NSDUH-FRR1-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/KPB2-2EAD] (an estimated 22.2 of 
the 27 million illicit drug users were current marijuana users). 
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the highest number of arrests.252 Consequently, marijuana is the single drug 
whose legalization would theoretically make the largest immediate impact upon 
resources and caseloads. Next, marijuana currently enjoys overwhelmingly fa-
vorable public support for de-criminalization.253 Therefore, ending marijuana 
prohibition is likely to be welcomed by the majority of citizens while being po-
litically advantageous to those making the suggested change. Finally, a majori-
ty of states have already proactively initiated the de-criminalization experiment 
and provided data that supports ending federal prohibition.254 Accordingly, 
lawmakers could carefully study the evolving condition of public defense in the 
recreational marijuana states, especially those with documented public defense 
struggles like Nevada and California. Thus, ending federal prohibition of mari-
juana is the best solution because it affects the highest number of people while 
making an immediate impact on structural deficiencies simply by acknowledg-
ing a path already trodden by individual pioneering states. 
Since additional funding necessary to prevent Sixth Amendment violations 
under current national policy appears unlikely at best, the federal government 
must at minimum declassify marijuana as a Schedule I substance. Under a new 
classification—one that could later be used for other illicit substances—the 
federal government can declare these drugs to be dangerous, recommend state 
prohibition, and still regulate interstate commerce that involves the substances. 
Federal trafficking laws specific—and limited—to marijuana crossing state 
borders would remain reasonable measures to achieve the compelling govern-
ment interests that revolve around illicit drug smuggling. Individual states 
could then decide on their local drug policies without fear of being in conflict 
with federal law. Then, those states that take on the additional demand of wag-
ing the War on Drugs within their borders must supply public defense funding 
sufficient to ensure free exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
counsel. 
Additionally, the federal government could still promote and endorse anti-
drug policies via Congressional authority under the Taxing and Spending 
Clause of the Constitution in a manner similar to its use of highway funding to 
encourage a minimum drinking age for alcohol.255 For example, businesses in 
the marijuana industry could pay a yearly fee for a permit to be a licensed sell-
er. These fees would create and replenish a federal public defense coffer. Then, 
to encourage states to prohibit drug use, Congress could condition federal fund-
ing for public defense—pulled from the federal public defense coffer—on state 
proscriptive laws. 
In this hypothetical arrangement, a recreational marijuana state like Nevada 
would not receive federal funding and their marijuana businesses would pay 
                                                        
252  Crime, Arrests and U.S. Law Enforcement, supra note 125. 
253  Press Release, Quinnipiac University, supra note 235. 
254  Steinmetz, supra note 166. 
255  See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208–09 (1987) (establishing a 5-point rule for 
conditional spending). 
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into the federal public defense coffer, but the state would still benefit by no 
longer shouldering the War on Drugs’s burden. On the other hand, a state with 
neither recreational nor medical marijuana would receive a share of funding 
apportioned from the federal public defense coffer based upon the state’s popu-
lation. Finally, states with medical-only marijuana would also be entitled to a 
share of the federal funding, but perhaps not the entire share they would receive 
with full prohibition. Consequently, the additional demand a state voluntarily 
places on itself to conform to a desired federal policy would be offset by the 
supply of additional funds provided by the federal government and obtained 
from the non-conforming states. 
Returning to Linda from the Prelude, the above hypothetical scenario still 
places her in jail. Without alternative federal action—such as authorizing inter-
state transport of small amounts of marijuana between the recreational states—
Linda has still broken federal law. However, she is now much more likely to 
receive the effective assistance of counsel the Constitution promises. This dis-
tinction should underscore that the purpose here is not to impede law enforce-
ment. Instead, the goal is to prevent the surrounding circumstances of the War 
on Drugs from causing systemic Sixth Amendment violations. 
As previously stated, this Note primarily focused on a single prohibited 
drug, yet this choice was simply because the effects, enforcement, and legisla-
tion surrounding marijuana are better known and documented. Further, since 
marijuana’s usage is much more prevalent, it harbors the potential for making 
the highest impact. Still, the same logical conclusions are easily extrapolated 
onto other drugs. Thus, for the many reasons discussed, this Note recommends, 
as a long-term solution, that the United States reserves laws regarding the per-
sonal consumption, possession, cultivation, and local distribution of all con-
trolled substances to the state laboratories of democracy. However, these laws 
must not give state governments a pass to violate Constitutional rights. As es-
tablished by both text and history, these fundamental rights include the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective counsel. Citizens of the various states should not 
accept a hostile federal government allowed to demand a standard for protect-
ing individual rights against government oppression while simultaneously wag-
ing a war which leaves a devastated landscape barren of these same rights. Ac-
cordingly, the United States should rescue the Sixth Amendment from the War 
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